Muppalla Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy in a supplement to Central Committee    message issued on 10th anniversary of the Communist Party of India-Maoist     (CPI-Maoist)

There has been an abrupt spike in Maoist violence in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, with 14 Security Force (SF) personnel killed, and 17 vehicles set on fire, by cadres of the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) between April 11 and 15, 2015.

On April 11, seven personnel of the Special Task Force (STF) of Chhattisgarh Police, including Platoon Commander Shankar Rao, were killed and 11 others were injured when Maoists ambushed an STF team of 49 personnel in the forests near Pidmal village under the Polampalli Police Station in Sukma District.

Barely, 24 hours had passed, when the Maoists set afire at least 17 vehicles engaged in mining work at the Barbaspur iron ore mining site under the limits of the Korar Police Station in Kanker District on April 12.

Striking on the same day, the Maoists attacked a Border Security Force (BSF) contingent that was patrolling the Chhote Baithiya BSF Camp under the Bande Police Station area, in Kanker District, late in the night of April 12, killing a trooper. Later, the body of one Maoist, killed in the return of fire, was recovered.

On April 13, five Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF) personnel were killed and another seven were injured, when Maoists blew up a mine protected vehicle (MPV) near Khudiyapara village on Kirandul-Cholnar Road in Dantewada District.

On April 15, the body of Bira Basant, a District Force (DF) trooper who was abducted by Maoists on April 7, was found on the Gangaloor-Bijapur Road with Maoist pamphlets strewn around.

On April 10, in an incident that did not received much attention, armed Maoists numbering around 30 to 40, set ablaze an under-construction Police Station in the Mudhia Mohara village in the Dongargarh area of Rajnandgaon District.

The spate of violence has again brought the focus on the Maoists and their surviving strengths and capabilities. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)database, in all theatres of Left Wing Extremist (LWE) violence across States, there were 314 fatalities, including 128 civilians, 87 Security Forces (SFs) personnel and 99 CPI-Maoist cadres, in LWE-related incidents in 2014. This was less than a third of such fatalities in the peak year, 2010, when at 1,180 fatalities were recorded. Maoist violence has come down to zero fatalities in West Bengal, from a peak of 425 killed in 2010; and has declined sharply in other States, including Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, Maharashtra and Bihar. The situation in Jharkhand has also seen major reverses for the Maoists.

Significantly, the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh alone accounted for 55 out of 87 SF fatalities across the States in 2014; as against 45 out of 111 in 2013. The deteriorating trend seems to be continuing, with the Bastar Division accounts for 24 of 30 SF fatalities across all States, in 2015, as of April 19. That Bastar Division has, consequently, emerged as the nucleus of the Maoist Tactical Counter-offensive (TCO). In the current year, as of April 19, Chhattisgarh has recorded 37 fatalities in LWE-related violence - including nine civilians, 24 SF personnel and four Maoists. All these fatalities have occurred in Bastar Division.

Beyond the crude data, among the latest incidents, two are significant because they buck the trend and in view of their potential ramifications. Firstly, unlike most of the past major incidents where the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) were principally targeted, it was the Chhattisgarh Police that has now suffered major casualties.

In the Pidmal ambush, an STF team of 49 personnel led by platoon commander Shankar Rao had gone for a swift operation, based on intelligence received by Rao. The probably planted intelligence appears to have been extremely tempting, seducing Rao into launching the operation without due clearances and sufficient backup. The unit made a journey of 18 kilometres through the jungles in the dark of night, but was ambushed in the morning. The eventual encounter was spread over three kilometres and involved three gun battles. Shankar Rao was killed in the first round of fire. Two subsequent engagements killed three troopers each. However, the STF managed to withdraw, managing to keep the total casualties low and losing just two weapons.

The pattern reflected the February 2, 2015, Kanker ambush, in which Bande Station House Officer (SHO) Avinash Sharma and Gopniya Sainik (secret agent) Sonu Ram Gawde were killed and another six SF personnel - three each from the Police and BSF - were injured, the team was led by Sharma, who received the apparently planted intelligence. Sharma was killed in the first hail of bullets from Maoists.

The Khudiyapara village MPV blast incident (April 13) was a clearly avoidable tragedy. The last incident of MPV blast before this in Chhattisgarh was on August 6, 2012 and Movements in MPVs have been banned by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) since June 30, 2013. In the latest MPV blast incident at Khudiyapara, the Maoists used about 80-100 kilograms of explosives that tossed the 50-tonne vehicle up in the air and created an 18-foot deep crater. After the blast, the Maoists resorted to indiscriminate firing, including Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) fire, to inflict more casualties. Dantewada Superintendent of Police (SP) Kamalochan Kashyap observed, "The Maoists were agitated ever since the Police post (at) Cholnar was set up in February. This barred them from entering 100 villages, which they ruled earlier. They coaxed the locals to take out rallies in protest of the Police camp. But in vain."

Official reactions to incidents have been as usual. Condemning the Pidmal attack [April 11], Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh, termed it "cowardly" and "shameful"; while Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared, "The Centre will take stringent action against the Naxalites (LWEs) who killed seven Policemen in Sukma District in Chhattisgarh." And when asked about the central government's stand againstNaxalites, Rajnath Singh responded tersely, "The Centre as well as the State Governments have initiated action against the Naxalites operating in the region to keep up the morale of the forces. Appropriate directions have been given to the state Chief Minister but I am not going to disclose the strategy just now before media." Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju added that, as the strategy followed so far had resulted in SF casualties, it would be reviewed in consultation with the States, especially in relation to the situation in Chhattisgarh.

Among the critical elements of any such review would need to be the deployment and use of the various Forces available for counter-insurgency operations in Maoist affected areas. The issue of coordination between CAPFs and State Police Forces has been a recurrent obstacle to effective action, and the CRPF had repeatedly complained that it was suffering heavy casualties because it received inadequate support from the State Police in Chhattisgarh. An overwhelming majority of SF fatalities in Chhattisgarh have been among the CAPFs, suggesting that State Forces were relatively inactive - or extraordinarily and inexplicably successful in avoiding casualties. Worse, after the December 1, 2014, debacle in which 14 CRPF personnel were killed in an ambush near Kasalpara village in Sukma District, the CRPF has given orders that all major operations must be cleared by headquarters. Media reports suggest that CPRF personnel have since virtually kept themselves confined to barracks. The onus of anti-Naxalite operations in Chhattisgarh had, before this, largely been borne by the 31 battalions of CAPFs deployed in the State. STF, the dedicated anti-Maoist force of the State Police, has only two battalions, which is extraordinary, since at least 22,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel have been trained at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College (CIJWC) at Kanker. There is no publicly available figure of how many of the CIJWC-trained personnel have actually been deployed in anti-Maoist operations, but unconfirmed reports suggest that an overwhelming proportion has been assigned to other duties.

Interestingly, the draft counter-Naxal strategy prepared by the Union Home Ministry in October 2014 is yet to be cleared by the Cabinet. The Union Government, in its 2015-16 Budget, has reduced the Central allocation to the States for Police Modernisation by INR eight billion, arguing that the States have been allocated an additional 10 per cent share from Central taxes, according to the recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission, and are expected draw on the increased allocation for Police modernization. Allocations for the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) [which was renamed as "Additional Central Assistance to LWE affected Districts" by the new NDA government at Centre] were also stopped on the same logic. However, allocations for the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), which were also stopped, were subsequently restored.

The problem with the revised process is that States have seldom coughed up funds for Policing, beyond the minimum necessary for maintenance, and are likely to continue to neglect pressing aspects of Police modernization. Indeed, if even some of the affected States falter in this regard, all of them are likely to suffer the consequences.

Both at a policy and operational level, consequently, there appears to be a measure of persistent disarray in the state's responses to the Maoist challenge. This is particularly unfortunate at the present juncture, when the Maoists have suffered enormous losses, particularly at leadership level, and are hemorrhaging cadres, with increasing numbers of surrenders and desertions. Indeed, the current Maoist TCO is a transient (the rains will soon bring it to an end) and desperate measure to restore a degree of morale among the rank and file in a situation of sustained reverses that the rebels have suffered. In a supplement to People's March (Vol. 13, September 2014) CPI-Maoist General Secretary, Muppala Lakshmana Rao aka Ganapathy acknowledges:

Our party lost considerable number of comrades belonging to all levels, right from CC to the village level, in the offensives of the enemy. Though leadership losses began since 2005 May itself, they increased gradually after Unity Congress and the situation took a serious turn by 2011 end. The leadership failed to a large extent in defending itself and the ranks. These losses weakened the three magic weapons of NDR - the party, PLGA (People's Liberation Guerilla Army) and the UF (United Front) - quite a lot. This failure is a very severe one.

There is an unprecedented opportunity for state consolidation at this juncture. This, however, will require the crystallization of a coherent strategy and enormous tactical coordination between available Forces of the States and the Centre, and across State boundaries. This, however, has been the gaping lacuna in the past, and there is much to suggest that this is yet to be filled.